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U.S. taxpayers are currently making good on a $100 billion or more Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) loss.
1 At the same time,
mounting Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) losses are leading
commentators to speculate about the financial condition of that fund. One
would hope that the solutions to the depository fund crises would "guarantee"
against repetitions of the crises.
The FSLIC debacle is generally viewed as having occurred in two stages.
2
First, sharply rising interest rates easily eliminated the net worth of most
thrifts owing to their asset-liability mismatch (borrowing short and lending
long). Second, thrifts took substantial risks (doubled their bets) in the 1980s,
as one might expect. The latter was made easier by the increase in deposit
insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000 per account and the enactment
of new asset powers (including additional flexibility in writing mortgage con-
tracts). Regulatory forbearance and loose oversight permitted this risk-taking
and led, in conjunction with the generous tax provisions of the 1981 Tax Law,
to substantial overbuilding in much of the United States and to subsequent
real estate depressions in many areas of the country.
Complicating matters has been the erosion in the basic profitability of thrift
mortgage portfolio lending. Owing to higher costs of deposit money and in-
creased deposit premiums, thrifts have not been the low-cost supplier of home
mortgage credit for some time.
3 With a low basic-profit stream, untoward
Patric H. Hendershott is professor of finance and public policy at Ohio State University and a
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. James D. Shilling is associate
professor of business at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
The authors thank James Barth, Edward Kane, and Eduardo Schwartz for their comments on
the version of this paper presented at the NBER Conference on Financial Crisis, 24 March 1990.
259260 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
events (credit problems, rising interest rates) quickly reduce capital, rather
than just lowering dividends, and, with little capital, soon increase taxpayer
liabilities.
We are now supposedly solving the thrift problem by recapitalizing (for-
bearance is out), reregulating (new assets powers are out), and reintroducing
strict oversight. It is noteworthy, however, that the original source of the prob-
lem—the vulnerability of thrifts to periods of sustained increases in interest
rates—has not been removed. In fact, lessening this vulnerability has been
hampered by the new regulations on trading assets—if thrifts sell any existing
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), they fear they will have to mark all such invest-
ments to market. In early 1989, thrifts were still using roughly 40 percent of
their short-term deposits to fund long-term fixed-rate mortgage investments,
and many of their adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) had rate caps that bind
in a period of sustained interest rate increases. Because current thrift regula-
tion concentrates on book, not market, values of assets, thrifts could continue
to operate even if their net worth were eliminated by increases in interest
rates.
In this paper, we attempt to document just how susceptible the thrift indus-
try continues to be to interest-rate risk. Optimistically assuming a 15 percent
pretax return on equity in a recapitalized industry, we find that a repetition of
the 1977-86 interest-rate cycle would generate cumulative cash-flow losses of
$100 billion to $130 billion within seven years. However, with a profitable,
well-capitalized industry, profits and capital could absorb this loss with negli-
gible implications for taxpayers. In contrast, if this cycle should occur today
or at any time before significant recapitalization and reprofitization occur, tax-
payers would be out another $50 billion to $100 billion.
The first two sections of this paper attempt to establish the appropriate start-
ing point for our analysis of thrift interest-rate sensitivity. Section 8.1 con-
structs an aggregate thrift balance sheet from individual institution data,
where the assets and liabilities are aggregated according to period until they
reprice. Nonperforming loans and assets that are now disfavored by regulators
are assumed to be sold, and two alternative capital infusions are presumed to
be made: $60 billion, to provide all thrifts with capital equal to at least 1.5
percent of tangible assets, or $79 billion, to give all thrifts at least 8 percent
of risk-weighted assets. Section 8.2 discusses the structure of thrift mortgage
portfolios, indicating the distribution of fixed-rate mortgages by coupon rate
and of adjustable-rate mortgages by repricing period, rate caps, and teasers.
Section 8.3 describes a method for computing changes in thrift net interest
income in response to changes in interest rates and calculates the impact of
higher interest rates on thrift net income under a variety of assumptions re-
garding interest rates, mortgage repayments, and thrift reinvestment. The im-
pact on thrift capital and U.S. taxpayers is discussed. A closing section sum-
marizes our findings, and an appendix describes some of the underlying data.261 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
8.1 Observed and Adjusted Thrift Balance Sheets in Early 1989
Table 8.1 contains the total thrift balance sheet for March 1989, obtained
by aggregating across all institutions then insured by FSLIC. The lower-case
letters in the table refer to rows in table 8A. 1 in the appendix. (The method of
computing risk-weighted assets, upon which risk-based capital requirements
are calculated, is described in table 8A. 1, while the current methods for com-
puting tangible and core capital are reported in table 8A.2.) Balance sheets
are also presented separately in table 8.1 for those thrifts with negative and
positive generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) net worth.
4 Ac-
cording to these data, 90 percent of thrift assets are in thrifts with positive
GAAP net worth.
Of course, these book net worth numbers have little meaning because many
assets have market values far below book. Probably the most egregious ex-
ample is the $133 billion in other assets. As can be seen in table 8.2, this
includes $34 billion in real estate owned (foreclosed on REO) and real estate
held for development (REH). Other assets also include $20 billion in goodwill
and about $60 billion in other items of dubious value. Based upon data re-
ported in Bovenzi and Murton (1988), we estimate that these assets in the
Table 8.1 Net Balance Sheet, Book Value (billions of $)
Net assets:
Net fixed rate =
(a + b + c + d) - (r + s)
Single-family ARMs = e
Adjustable-rate and balloon =
f + g
Net intermediate assets
= (h + i) - .75q
Equities except FHLB-FHLMC
= m
Other assets = n
Total assets
Total risk-weighted assets
Net liabilities and net worth:
Net short-term =
(o + p + .25q) - (j + k + 1)
GAAP net worth = t
Total liabilities and net worth
Memo
RAP capital














































Source: Appendix table 8A. 1.262 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
Table 8.2 Composition of Other Assets (billions of $)
REO and REH, net of valuation
allowances (ATREO +
AREH - A355)




Other assets, net of val allow
(ATOA
d-A590)






























Source: Office of Thrift Supervision, quarterly Thrift Financial Report (March 1989).
aData on percentage markdowns were obtained from Bovenzi and Murton (1988).
bEquity in service corporations that are engaged in impermissible activities is in 100 percent
bucket; that in those engaged in permissible activities is in 50 percent bucket (permissible activ-
ities have not yet been defined).
cAmount counted as assets is the minimum of total goodwill (A544) or 1.5 percent of tangible
assets (A800 - A525 - A544 - C992).
dATOA = other assets (A460 through A580 - A490 - A544 - 542) + financing leases (A240
through A260) - deferrals (A525 + C992).
aggregate, excluding fixed assets (branches, etc.), are overstated by $32 bil-
lion dollars.
5 In addition, $35 billion of loans are nonperforming (16 percent
of loans at thrifts with negative net worth are delinquent). If we value these
loans at 80 cents on the dollar, market value is $7 billion below book (we show
in section 8.2 that the market value of performing fixed-rate mortgages ap-
proximates their book value). Finally, the $15 billion of thrift junk bonds (part
of the intermediate assets category in table 8.1) are probably $4 billion below
market value. Taking into account all these deviations of market from book
values, the market value of net worth for the industry is negative $23 billion,
not positive $20 billion. Also, only 50 percent of thrift assets are held by
thrifts with positive market-value net worth.
Table 8.3 is an adjusted aggregate balance sheet based on the following
assumptions. First, all the other assets in table 8.2, except for fixed assets, are
"sold" for $94 billion, and equities (except FHLB-FHLMC stock) are sold for
par. Second, $35 billion of loans ($4 billion each of FRMs and ARMs and
$27 billion of other adjustable-rate and balloon loans) are sold for $28 billion,
and $15 billion in junk bonds are sold for $11 billion. Third, all of the sale
proceeds are used to reduce short-term debt. The result is a 15 percent reduc-
tion in thrift total assets. Fourth, we infuse the industry with new capital and
use this, too, to reduce short-term debt.
We analyze two infusions. In the first, each thrift is given sufficient new263 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
capital to raise its capital to 1.5 percent of total assets (the tangible capital
requirement). In the second, each thrift is given enough capital to increase its
capital to 8 percent of risk-weighted assets, or roughly 5 percent of total as-
sets. The two infusions are $60 billion and $79 billion. With the smaller in-
fusion, short-term deposits are reduced by 14 percent; with the larger infu-
sion, the reduction is 16 percent. We take the resultant balance sheet(s) shown
in table 8.3 as the starting point for our analysis (actually, the individual thrift
balance sheets that are consistent with this aggregate balance sheet are the
starting point).
Table 8.3 indicates that thrifts still have a substantial asset-liability maturity
imbalance poblem. A full 40 percent of thrift assets would be long-term
fixed-rate loans funded by short-term deposits. (The $399 billion is slightly
greater than the dollar value of fixed-rate loans funded by short-term deposits









Net liabilities and net worth:
Net short-term
Market-value net worth
Total liabilities and net worth
Memo:





















































"Net fixed rate reduced by the $4 billion of fixed-rate mortgage loans assumed to be delinquent.
bSingle-family ARMs reduced by the $4 billion of adjustable-rate mortgage loans assumed to be
delinquent.
'Adjustable-rate and balloon reduced by $27 billion estimated to be delinquent.
dNet intermediate assets reduced by $15 billion in junk bonds.
cOther assets are reduced by $111 billion, as all other assets except fixed assets are assumed to
be sold, but increased by $4 billion of appraised equity capital.
"Net short-term liabilities are reduced by $102 billion of proceeds from asset sales and $60 billion
($79 billion) infusion of new capital to bring tangible capital (RAP capital) to 1.5 percent of
tangible assets (8 percent of risk-weighted assets).
8Net worth is reduced by $63 billion loss on asset sales, but increased by an assumed $60 billion
($79 billion) capital infusion. This infusion is the amount of capital needed to bring core capital
(RAP capital) to 1.5 percent of tangible assets (8 percent of risk-weighted assets), $58 billion
($71 billion) for thrifts with negative net worth and $2 billion ($8 billion) for other thrifts.264 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
a decade earlier.) In addition, many of the adjustable-rate loans have rate caps
that will bind significantly if we experience a period of rates rising as sharply
as they did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While thrifts could be hedging
much of this risk through cash markets or with futures, interest-rate swaps,
interest-rate caps, and so on, the data indicate little cash-market hedging, and
anecdotal evidence suggests little use of other hedging devices.
6
Table 8.4 shows some detail on how the industry's assets are distributed
across thrifts with different percentages of required and actual capital, both
before and after our liquidating the below-market thrift assets and injecting
new capital into the industry. For the observed balance sheet, we define capital
in three ways: 8 percent of risk-weighted assets (the end of 1992 requirement),
RAP capital (regulatory accounting capital, see table 8A.2) and actual (our
estimate) market-value capital. Note that the end of 1992 regulations require
that almost all thrifts have capital greater than 3 percent of total assets. Cur-
rently, two-thirds of thrift assets are in thrifts that have 3 percent RAP capital,
but only 29 percent of thrift assets are in thrifts with 3 percent market-value
capital. Moreover, 44 percent of thrift assets are (as of March 1989) in thrifts
with negative market-value capital.
When the balance sheet is adjusted, the required capital-to-total-asset ratio
for most thrifts declines because we have liquidated relatively risky assets.
Actual capital, of course, rises. With the smaller infusion, all thrifts have
Table 8.4 Dollars of Assets in Institutions with Different Percentages of Required





















































































aMarket value capital = GAAP net worth in table 8.1, after assets are marked to market; includes
appraised equity capital.
Infusion brings tangible capital up to at least 1.5 percent of tangible assets.
'Infusion brings RAP capital up to at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets.
dBook value of total assets from appendix table 8A. 1, including loans on deposits and deferred losses.
eAdjusted value of total assets = book value of total assets, including loans on deposits — delinquent
mortgage loans — junk bonds — equities except FHLB-FHLMC — other assets except fixed + ap-






































































Source: Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Report (September 1989). We thank Bill
McGuire of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati for providing us with the FRM balance
data.
"On 20 February 1990.
bBook (total) times GNMA price divided by 100.
capital of at least 1.5 percent of assets, but note that less than half of thrift
assets are in thrifts with at least 2 percent market-value capital. With the larger
infusion, over 90 percent of thrift assets are in thrifts with over 3 percent
market-value capital.
8.2 Thrift Mortgage Portfolios
Both the market values of thrift FRM and ARM portfolios and the sensitiv-
ity of these to increases in interest rates depends on the level of the coupons
on the mortgages relative to market coupon rates and the tightness of ARM
rate caps. This section provides the available data on FRMs and ARMs.
Table 8.5 contains the distribution of FRMs on September 1989 according
to coupon and remaining term to maturity. As can be seen, 80 percent had
coupons between 8 and 11 percent. The second column from the right gives
20 February 1990 prices on Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) securities with coupons equal to 8 percent, the midpoint of each of
the coupon ranges in column 1 (rows 2-6), and 14.5 percent, respectively.
The far right column is an estimate of the market value of the volume in each
coupon range. Cumulating over the ranges, one obtains a market-value esti-
mate for the total industry FRM portfolio only $1.3 billion less than book
value. That is, in February 1990, below-market FRMs were not an industry
problem.
Table 8.6 reports the distribution of ARMs originated at 707 thrifts during
May-July of 1986 through 1989, by the years to repricing (<1 year vs. >1
year), the annual rate cap (1 or 2 percent), and the magnitude of the initial
teaser (<0.5 percent up to >2.5 percent). The data do not indicate significant266 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
Table 8.6 Distribution of ARMs by Size of Teaser, Years Until Repricing, and
Annual Rate Caps

























































Distribution of ARMs by Percentage that Fully Adjusted Rate is



















































Source: Federal Housing Finance Board, Mortgage Interest Rate Survey, May-July of 1986-89.
changes over time in either the years to repricing or the per-period rate cap.
Just over 90 percent of ARMs issued in each year reprice within a year, and
roughly 80 percent of ARMs have 2 percent annual caps. Virtually all of the
ARMs have 5 percent life-of-loan caps.
In contrast, there is a clear trend toward the use of heavily discounted initial
interest rates, or teaser rates, after 1986. The percentage of ARMs with a
teaser of 2.5 percent or greater rose from only 6 percent in 1986 to 24 percent
in 1989. This could be an indication of increased risk-seeking by underwater
thrifts. These deep teasers are a potential problem because the effective life-
of-loan rate cap on a deep teaser is lower than that on a shallow teaser, that is,
rate caps on deep-teaser loans are more likely to bind.
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 illustrate the potential problems with deep-teaser ARMs.
In March 1989, 23 percent of ARMs had coupon rates less than 3 percentage
points from their maxima, and another 15 percent were within 4 percent-
age points. As is shown in table 8.8, most (84 percent) of the ARMs within 3
points of their life-of-loan caps were one-year (or less) ARMs with a 2 percent267 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
Table 8.8 Percentage of ARMs in Institutions Having More Than X Percent of
ARMs with Fully Adjusted Rate Within 3 Percent of Life-of-Loan
Rate Ceiling
1 -year (and less) 3-year (and more)























































Source: Federal Housing Finance Board, Mortgage Interest Rate Survey, May-July of 1986-89.
per period cap, and these were concentrated within a few thrifts. More than
half of these ARMs were at institutions with over 60 percent of their ARMs
within 3 points of the ceiling, and 60 percent were at a single institution.
In the calculations reported in the next section, we assume that ARMs orig-
inated by all thrifts throughout 1986-89 were either one- or three-year Trea-
sury ARMs and had terms (teasers, rate caps, and fully adjusted margins)
identical to those at the 707 thrifts from which we have data. ARMs originated
in 1982-85 are assumed to have been identical to those originated in 1986.
We further assume that all originated ARMs have been maintained in the port-
folios of the originating institutions. While these assumptions are obviously
not fully correct, there is no reason to believe that they bias our loss calcula-
tions either up or down.
8.3 The Impact of Increases in Interest Rates
One can compute the impact of changes in interest rates on the thrift indus-
try in two ways. First, one could postulate a one-time change in interest rates
and calculate the change in the market values of thrift assets and liabilities,
and thus net worth. Second, one could postulate an altered future path of
interest rates, calculate the impact on thrift net interest income, and cumulate
the net income changes over time. These calculations are related because the
market value of an asset is the sum of the asset's expected future cash flows,
appropriately discounted. Because computing market values of a wide variety
of assets with call options and rate caps is such a formidable task (see, for
example, Schwartz and Torous, in this volume), we have chosen the second
method. We will, however, analyze a complete cycle—interest rates rising
and falling—and we cumulate net income changes for a decade following the268 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
completion of the cycle, thereby capturing most of the market-value implica-
tions of assets put on the books while interest rates were temporarily high. We
begin by describing a method for calculating net interest-income losses and
then present the calculations.
8.3.1 Method for Calculating Net Interest Income Losses
When interest rates rise, the net income from FRMs funded with short-term
deposits declines and may turn negative. The decline in net income equals the
increase in deposit interest paid less any increase in interest income coming
from the investment of FRM repayments at higher interest rates. Assume that
the initial book value of short-funded FRMs is FR and that a constant func-
tion, (f>, of these mortgages repay each year. If deposit rates rise from r0 to r,,
the interest lost in the next year, assuming 100 percent debt financing, is
simply (r, — ro)(l — <$>)FR. This loss is then multiplied by the initial ratio of
short-term liabilities to net financial assets, Go, to reflect less than 100 percent
debt financing.
The cumulative loss on the initial short-funded FRMs over a twenty-year
period, ignoring losses on repayments (or simply assuming they are rein-
vested at the all-in deposit cost), is
FRZ 0 - <t>)'©o(r, " r0).
t= i
If repayments at the end of year 0, §FR, are reinvested in FRMs, they will
generate additional future losses if deposit rates continue to rise unexpectedly
or will produce future gains if deposit rates return to their initial levels. The
cumulative loss over the next twenty years from repayments at the end of year
Ois
20
4>F*2 0 - 4>)'-'[©,(''f - r0) - (r™ - rg™)],
t= i
where r™
M = ^ vv^.r™^ and vvy is the proportion of the outstanding FRM
j
stock originated j periods ago. More generally, the total cumulative loss, as-
suming that all prepayments are reinvested in FRMs, is
~ 4>YQ0(r, - r0) + cbF/?2)d ~ W-Wfr, - r0)
(1) - 0T
M - r™)] + • • •
20
The losses for ARMs are calculated similarly. If the book value of short-
funded ARMs is AR and deposit rates rise from r0 to r,, the interest lost in the
next year is [90(r, - ro)-(r£,
R
M - r£f
M)](l - <\>)AR. Of course, if the ARM269 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
coupon rises by the increase in deposit costs and 100 percent debt financing is
employed (9 = 1), no interest is lost. The cumulative loss on AR over the
twenty-year period, ignoring repayments, is
20




If repayments, §AR, are reinvested in identical ARMs (except for their
higher initial rate), the repayments can also generate losses should rates rise
further in the future. This loss over the next twenty years is
W-'ie^r, - r.) - (r™ - /•£*)].
t= i
The total cumulative loss, assuming all prepayments are reinvested in identi-
cal ARMs, is
20
" 4>y[eo(rf - r0) - (r-r ~ r™)]




2 a - <i>)'"
2o[02o(^ - ^o) - (^r
We still need to specify the coupon on existing ARMs. If interest rates have
risen since the ARM was originated, the coupon at time t is the minimum of
the fully adjusted coupon (r£) and of the coupons resulting from binding an-
nual (cA) and life-of-loan (cL) rate caps:
7
(3) rf
M = min(rj, rj), r
Ljt),
where rft = rfi**f + cAandr
Ljt = r*
RM + cL. If interest rates have fallen,
the coupon is the maximum of the fully adjusted coupon and that resulting
from a binding annual rate floor (fA):
(4) r*™ = max(r;, £,,),
where ^ = rj™ - fA.
The total loss in interest income (for each year from initial year 0), due to a
series of upward-interest-rate surprises, is the sum of the losses on FRMs,
ARMs, and intermediate assets, minus the gain from less than 100 percent
debt financing of fully adjustable rate loans (ADJ). In equation form,
N
(5) Lost Income = LFRM + LARM + LINT - 2(1 ~ ^o)(
r, ~ ro)ADJ, t=\
where LINT is the negligible loss from short-funding intermediate assets, and
the summation measures the gain from fully adjustable rate loans.
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The capital loss for a thrift is the difference between lost income and the
thrift's earnings in the absence of interest-rate increases. In the absence of rate
increases, thrifts would do very well, earning the value of the call options and
rate caps on home mortgages they are selling to households plus a normal
return on equity. We assume that the value of the call options and rate caps is
equivalent to a 0.75 percent annual return on their home mortgage portfolios,
or $5 billion a year given an FRM plus ARM base of $732 billion. The value
of ARM rate caps obviously varies with the specific terms of the ARM
contract—deep teasers and tight caps have greater value to borrowers (see
Schwartz and Torous, in this volume)—and with economic conditions—
when interest rates are expected to rise and/or rate volatility is high, caps are
worth more (Buser, Hendershott, and Sanders 1985). Similarly, the value of
the call option is less the lower is the mortgage coupon relative to market
coupons and the less likely are interest rates to decline (Buser, Hendershott,
and Sanders 1990). We have not attempted to account for these differences;
raising or lowering the $5 billion estimate by, say, 25 percent would have little
impact on our calculations.
We take the normal pretax return on equity, somewhat optimistically, to be
15 percent. When thrifts have $43 billion in capital (the $60 billion infusion),
this implies an average 0.0067 return on total assets (TA) and a $6.5 billion
cushion, in the aggregate, against declines in net interest income. We compute
the capital loss as
9
(6) Capital Loss, = Lost Income, - 0.0075(FRM, + ARM,) - 0.0067TA0.
8.3.2 Loss Calculations
Given unchanged asset and liability mixes and no asset sales, net interest
income losses depend on three factors: the pattern of future deposit and mort-
gage interest rates, the rate at which mortgages repay, and the extent to which
repayments are reinvested. We do not want to analyze the expected or most
likely future path of interest rates because expected future rates likely differ
little from current rates. Rather, we want to analyze a "bad case" scenario. We
take as our bad scenario—one that might plausibly occur over the next decade
or two—that which occurred in the decade 1977-86.
Table 8.9 presents data on interest rates and mortgage repayments during
the 1977-86 period. Both one- and three-year Treasury bill rates rose by 8 to
9 percentage points between 1977 and 1981, fell by 4 to 5 points between
1981 and 1983, rose by 1.5 points in 1984, and then fell by over 2 points in
1985 and 1986. The observed ratio of annual aggregate thrift mortgage repay-
ments (amortization plus prepayments) to mortgage loans outstanding was 11
percent in 1977-78, when some of the high-rate mortgages originated in
1973-74 were refinanced, fell to around 7 percent in 1980-82 when mortgage
rates peaked, jumped to 15 percent in 1983-85 when many of the 1980-82
mortgages were being refinanced, and increased even further when mortgage271 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts















































Source: Treasury yields are from Federal Reserve Bulletin, U.S. Treasury Notes and Bonds Con-
stant Maturities; mortgage repayment rate is from Office of Thrift Supervision, Savings and Home
Financing Source Book.
rates troughed in 1986. In our bad-case scenario, we let the one- and three-
year Treasury rates move exactly as they did in the 1977-86 period and then
hold them at their 1977 values for the next decade. Rates on FRMs are as-
sumed to move by 80 percent of the variation in the one-year rate.
A single repayment factor for FRMs is inappropriate given the obvious sen-
sitivity of repayments to interest rates. In the aggregate, FRMs are presumed
to repay at the rates observed over the 1977-86 period during the first ten
years of our scenario. However, mortgages originated in different years are
assumed to repay at different rates. In years 7-9 (1983-85), mortgages origi-
nated in years other than 4-6 (1980-82) are presumed to repay at a 9.5 per-
cent rate, and the mortgages for years 4-6 are presumed to repay at a rate
sufficient to raise the overall FRM repayment rate to 15 percent. In years 10
and beyond, FRMs originated before year 4 (1980) and after year 9 (1985) are
assumed to repay at the 9.5 percent rate; originations in all other years repay
at an 18 percent rate.
1
0 For ARMs, we assume a 10 percent repayment rate.
We also simulate a less-severe interest rate cycle in which interest rates
move by half the 1977-86 movement. This is not unlike the movement in
interest rates in the 1965-72 period. For FRMs, we keep the basic 9.5 percent
repayment rate, varying it in the same years as before but only by half as
much. For ARMs, we use the basic 10 percent repayment rate.
The upper panel of table 8.10 contains the scenario where interest rates
move as they did in the 1977-86 period (see col. 1 of the table). The tenth
year contains the losses for years 10 to 20, present valued to the tenth year
using the tenth year one-year Treasury rate, and the far right column gives the
totals. The total loss is divided into portions owing to FRMs and ARMs, and
the total is reduced by the earnings thrifts would have recorded had interesto o as o ON oo o
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rates not risen to give the capital loss. As can be seen in the far right column,
the cumulative loss is $88 billion. Moreover, the cumulative losses reach $106
billion in the seventh year. Most of the losses are on FRMs, although ARMs
account for $27 billion of the loss. Finally, the cumulative capital loss, that is,
the potential cost to the taxpayer is $43 billion.
The lower panel of table 8.10 pertains to a less-severe increase in interest
rates; as the first row shows, the rates are up by only half as much as in the
top panel. As one would expect, the losses on FRMs are about half as great.
For ARMs, though, the losses are only 30 percent as large ($8 billion vs. $27
billion). This is because the 2 percent per annum cap never binds and the life-
of-loan cap binds far less than half as much. The cumulative cash-flow loss is
still $39 billion, but there is virtually no capital loss.
Table 8.11 gives more detail on the ARM losses and summary statistics for
alternative reinvestment scenarios. Looking at column 1 first, we see that
most of the ARM losses are due to life-of-loan caps and little result from
annual caps. While the annual caps cause some loss in the first two years (after
which the life-of-loan cap binds), the annual rate floors save a little interest
when interest rates decline. Two reinvestment alternatives are considered.
First, we assume that FRM repayments are not reinvested but rather are used
to reduce short-term borrowing. Second, we assume that both FRM and ARM
repayments are reinvested in ARMs.
In the original calculations, FRM repayments were assumed to be rein-
vested in FRMs paying the then-higher coupon rate. In the first year or two,
when interest rates have not risen sharply, reinvestments increase losses be-
cause the higher coupon income over the life of the mortgage will not out-
weigh the higher deposit costs over the interest rate cycle. However, reinvest-
ments later on, when mortgage rates are near their peak, will generate far
more interest income than the temporarily higher deposit costs. On net, rein-
Table 8.11 Breakdown of Losses Under Alternative Interest Rate Scenarios and
Repayment Assumptions (billions of $)
Full Rate Rise Rates Rise Half as Much
No Reinvestment No Reinvestment
Base Reinvestment of FRMs Base Reinvestment of FRMs
Case of FRMs in ARMs Case of FRMs in ARMs
Loss due to FRMs









































"Includes a negligible loss on net intermediate assets and a small gain from less than 100 percent debt
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vestment in FRMs reduces losses from the interest rate cycle." Thus, assum-
ing no reinvestment (assuming that the industry is downsized) increases the
cumulative losses on FRMs by $48 billion and increases the total loss by $45
billion. However, the aggregate capital loss rises by only $14 billion because
most of the additional cash-flow losses come after year 6 and are offset by the
basic $11.5 billion cash flow thrifts would earn in the absence of a rise in
interest rates.
Given that interest rates eventually decline to their initial values, reinvest-
ing FRM repayments in ARMs makes things even worse because high-coupon
ARMs adjust downward when interest rates come back down. Thus the losses
from reinvestment of FRMs in ARMs in the early years outweigh the gains
from reinvestment in later years (when annual rate floors hold ARM coupons
up). This reinvestment increases cumulative ARM losses, the total cumulative
loss and the aggregate capital loss by about $8 billion. Overall, these alterna-
tive reinvestment scenarios increase the $43 billion aggregate capital loss to
$57 billion and $66 billion.
The taxpayers could lose less than the capital losses reported in table 8.11
for two reasons. First, $46 billion to $65 billion of shareholder capital, pre-
ferred stock, and subordinated debentures stands between the taxpayer and
losses, depending on how well thrifts are recapitalized. Second, regulators
could close the thrifts down shortly after interest rates start rising and liquidate
their assets before the losses from even higher interest rates cumulate.
To expect such rapid behavior of regulators, especially when over half of
thrift assets are in thrifts with capital amounting to less than 2 percent of as-
sets, is unrealistic. Only a year or two of rising interest rates would wipe out
that net worth, and by then the market value of existing loans would be far
under water (from table 8.5, it would appear that a 2.5 percentage point in-
crease in FRM rates would lower the market value of FRMs by 10 percent, or
$40 billion). Moreover, if the thrifts are not closed down, they will be sorely
tempted to take greater risks, possibly compounding the losses, as was the




This illustrates the fundamental point of the paper. If thrifts are only weakly
recapitalized, taxpayers will continue to be at risk. For example, if the 1977—
86 interest rate cycle were to occur today, when thrifts have very little capital
or basic cash-flow income to offset reductions in cash flow caused by the in-
crease in interest rates, taxpayers would suffer large losses. Probably 90 per-
cent of the $88 billion to $141 billion total loss would be a capital loss, and
with little capital, most of the loss would be passed through to taxpayers. A
$50 billion to $100 billion loss would be expected.
In contrast, well-capitalized thrifts have clear incentives not to take signifi-
cant interest rate risk because their own capital is at risk. Moreover, if they
take risks and lose, the taxpayer does not take most of the hit. Finally, the275 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
greater capital gives regulators more time to act before net worth goes nega-
tive and taxpayers take losses.
Getting an extra $60 billion to $80 billion of capital into the thrift industry
is a formidable task. In fact, under current conditions it is impossible. Maybe
in a decade, when the industry can again attract funds at reasonable rates
owing to reduced deposit insurance premiums and a generally lower cost of
funds, equity capital will be attainable. Until then, and possibly even after-
ward, the interest-rate-risk exposure of thrifts needs to be closely monitored.
A good first start is the new Thrift Bulletin (TB13) requirement that thrift
boards of directors must consider the sensitivity of thrift market-value net
worth to movements in interest rates of 400 basis points (although the wisdom
of analyzing a parallel shift in the yield curve when long-term rates are known
to move less than short rates is questionable). However, the results of these
analyses should be filed quarterly with the supervisory authorities, and spe-
cific regulatory actions should be triggered for those thrifts that are increasing
interest-rate-risk exposure. In the long run, something like the interest-rate-
risk component of the capital requirements contained in the thrift capital re-
quirements developed in response to the recommendations promulgated in
1987 by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Prac-
tices, may be needed.
8.4 Summary
Our examination of thrift balance sheets in early 1989 suggested an existing
capital shortfall in the thrift industry of $60 billion to $79 billion. Unfortu-
nately, the problem does not seem to be being cleaned up in a rapid, efficient
manner, so the shortfall is undoubtedly greater now and will be even greater
in the future (Kane 1989b). In any event, our analysis begins with assump-
tions regarding liquidation of nonperforming thrift assets, a 15 percent down-
sizing of the thrift industry, and either a $60 billion capital infusion to bring
market-value capital of each thrift up to at least 1.5 percent of total assets or a
$79 billion capital infusion to raise capital to 8 percent of risk-weighted as-
sets. The industry balance sheets, so adjusted, still show the industry short
funding $400 billion of long-term fixed-rate loans, a greater absolute maturity
mismatch than existed in 1977, and having $325 billion in adjustable-rate
loans with interest-rate caps.
A repeat of the 1977-86 interest cycle would be extremely costly to the
thrift industry and, unless the industry is adequately recapitalized, ultimately
to U.S. taxpayers. Thrifts would suffer cumulative cash-flow losses of $100
billion to $140 billion. About 70 percent of these losses would be due to
FRMs; the rest to rate caps on ARMs. If thrifts were both profitable and well
capitalized, the basic earnings of thrifts and their capital would be sufficient
to cover such losses. However, under current industry conditions, taxpayers
would lose $50 billion to $100 billion, and the loss would be magnified if276 Patric H. Hendershott and James D. Shilling
thrifts again took on greater risk. This illustrates a danger in letting the thrift
mess drag on. Taxpayers will continue to be at substantial risk until the thrift
industry is either recapitalized or liquidated.
Our analysis needs to be qualified because of the many assumptions upon
which it is based. For example, we assume that all ARMs originated in the
1980s have been held in portfolio, and this is certainly not correct. For ex-
ample, half of the ARMs with coupons within 3 percentage points of their
life-of-loan rate cap have been originated by a single thrift that is known to
sell ARMs. But these ARMs have likely been sold to other thrifts, thrifts with
relatively less capital than the originating thrift. That is, the assumption that
ARMs are not sold is more likely to understate the vulnerability of the thrift
industry to increases in rates than to overstate the vulnerability.
Probably the most controversial assumption is that thrifts are not hedging
through interest-rate swaps and caps, and so on. This assumption is obviously
incorrect in its extreme form, but again we do not believe that it leads to a
serious overstatement of thrift interest-rate sensitivity. Our first defense is that
the thrift "experts" we have spoken with do not believe much hedging is going
on. A second, and possibly related, defense is that over half of thrift assets are
in institutions that have no incentive to hedge: they have few earnings to pay
for hedging and little net worth to protect. Locking themselves into a nega-
tive, or minimal, net worth position is unlikely to be their preferred strategy.277 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
Appendix
Table 8A.1 Thrift Balance Sheet and Risk Weighting, Book Value (billions of $)
Assets:
Fixed-rate loans
a. Single-family FRMs (H070 - MBSs)
b. MBSs:GNMAs
c. MBSs:Other
d. Multifamily and nonresidential
(HI 10)
Adjustable-rate loans and second mortgage
e. Single-family ARMs (F402)
f. Balloon and adjustable-rate loans,
including construction loans, AED
loans, etc. (H030 - F402)
g. Second mortgage loans, largely home
equity loans (HI50)
Intermediate term
h. Consumer loans, net of loans on
deposits (HI90 - A170) (plus some
seconds)
i. Other investments (including junk
bonds, CMOs, and REMICs) (H270
- A370 - A382 - A400)
Short term
j. Cash and demand deposits (A360)
k. U.S. government and agencies
(A370)
1. Commercial loans and accrued interest
(H230 + A390)
m. Equities except FHLB-FHLMC (A382)
n. Nonfinancial assets, net of valuation
allowances (A800 -H310 - A360
- A390 - A525 - C992)
Total assets, net of deferred losses and
loans on deposits
Liabilities
o. Deposits (B012 + BOH + B016 +
BO 18)*
p. Other short-term borrowing, including
commercial bank loans (B030),
Reverse repurchase agreements
(B040), Consumer retail repurchase
agreements (B050), Net demand
deposit overdrafts (B060 - A170),
Commercial paper (B070), Other
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Table 8A.1 (continued)
Liabilities
q. Advances plus other borrowing (B020
+ B100)
h
r. Long-term liabilities, other than those
listed above (B800 - [deposits +
other short-term borrowing +
advances + A170])
s. Subordinated debentures (B310 +
B312)
t. GAAP net worth
k












Source: Office of Thrift Supervision, quarterly Thrift Financial Report. In sections A, B, C, F
and H of the Report, all data are as of March 1989.
Sections A and B provide information on balance sheet items. Section C provides information
on modified equity capital items and adjustments to modified equity capital for institutions re-
porting on a GAAP basis. Section F (supplemental monthly data) reports on activity during the
month and balances of loans and commitments outstanding as of the end of the month. Section
H (maturity and yield/cost information) provides maturity and yield data on conventional mort-
gages secured by 1-4 dwelling units with fixed rates, balloon and adjustable-rate mortgage loans,
other mortgage loans and contracts, and investment securities.
Note: We thank Carol Wambeke of the Office of Thrift Supervision for providing us with asset
risk-weighting.
"Net of share of valuation allowances for mortgages (A129 + A131).
bMBSs are divided into GNMAs and others based on a survey of commercial banks and savings
and loan associations (see Nothaft 1989).
cNet of share of valuation allowances for nonmortgages (A270 + A280 + A290).
"•Delinquent loans are in the 100 percent bucket; in general, delinquent loans equal loans x
(delinquent mortgage loans [FDQML]/net mortgage loans & contracts [ATMLCN]).
e50 percent weight for properties with under 36 units; 100 percent weight for properties with 36
or more units. We follow the Office of Thrift Supervision in assuming that all properties have
under 36 units. Delinquent multifamily and nonresidential loans are in the 100 percent bucket,
delinquent loans are in the 200 percent bucket.
fIn 1986, 96 percent of deposits had maturities of 3 years or less; 4 percent had maturities
between 5 to 10 years.
hIn 1986, 70 percent of Federal Home Loan Bank advances had maturities between 2 to 10 years;
76 percent of other borrowings had maturities between 3 to 10 years. Average duration of Federal
Home Loan Bank advances is roughly 2 years.
'See table 8.2.
JNumbers in parentheses represent total assets (risk-based assets), including loans on deposits and
deferred losses.
kAlso includes a minuscule amount of net worth certificates (B320 + B33O + B340 + B35O —
B380) and accumulated annual income payments, not due and payable (B360).279 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
Table 8A.2 Measurement of Regulatory Capital (billions of $)
Core capital (tier 1):
GAAP net worth
— Excluded goodwill (A544 — included goodwill)"





Supplementary capital (tier 2):
Subordinated debentures (B310 + B312)
+ Perpetual preferred stock (CO 12)
+ Qualifying pledged deposits (C958)
+ Valuation allowances'"
+ Other supplementary capital
1
1




Tangible capital (core capital — A544)
Required tangible capital













Source: Office of Thrift Supervision, Thrift Financial Report, March 1989, Section C.
"Included goodwill equals min[total goodwill, 0.015*tangible assets].
bRequired core capital equals 3 percent of tangible assets.
included valuation allowance equals min[C960, 0.015*risk-weighted assets].
"Other supplementary capital includes capital certificates (B320 + B330 + B340 + B350) and
accumulated annual income payments, not due and payable (B360).
eRAP capital equals core capital plus supplementary capital, where supplementary capital may
not exceed core capital.
'Required tangible capital equals 1.5 percent of tangible assets.
?8 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Table 8A.3 Distribution of ARMs by Size of Teaser, Years Until Repricing, and
Annual Rate Caps, 1986-1989 (% of ARMs)
1-year and less 3-year and more
Annual Cap Annual Cap




























































































































































Source: Federal Housing Finance Board, Mortgage Interest Rate Survey, May-July of 1986-89.
Notes
1. Kane (1989b, table 3-4) estimates a $55 billion loss at thrifts with negative net
worth (as measured by generally accepted accounting principles) and tangible-
insolvent thrifts as of 30 September 1988, a loss that was increasing by over $1 billion
a month.
2. See Kane (1989a, chap. 3) for an enlightening discussion of the development of
the debacle.
3. For a discussion of the basic profitability problems of solvent thrifts, see Hender-
shott (1989).
4. Book net worth exceeds GAAP capital to the extent that the appraised value of
fixed assets exceeds their book value.
5. Bovenzi and Murton (1988) break down the total loss on assets at commercial
banks into four asset categories: 1) doubtful or loss; 2) substandard; 3) nonclassified
risk assets; and 4) income earned but not collected. The estimated losses (per dollar)
for each of these four asset categories are $0.92, $0.61, $0.20, and $0.20, respec-281 The Continued Interest-Rate Vulnerability of Thrifts
tively. We have assumed that REO and REH are doubtful or loss assets, and equity in
service corporations (which is often used to hide underwater assets) and other assets
are nonclassified risk assets.
6. Thrifts hold $7 billion in interest-only mortgages, but also $4 billion in principal-
only mortgages. In addition, they hold $16 billion in collateralized mortgage obliga-
tions (CMOs), but we do not know the maturity of these. We have classified the aggre-
gate of all these assets as intermediate-term loans. See Kaufman (1984) for a primer
on hedging the market value of net worth, and Breeden and Giarla (1988) for an ad-
vanced treatment.
7. With one exception: the initial coupon on a teaser ARM is set below all of these
rates.




T = Vi{rt + r,_, + rt_2). The loss of interest income on intermediate as-
sets, INTER, over the twenty-year period is
20
LINT = 2(e,Ar, - ArJ
NT)INTER.
This loss is trivial because thrifts have only $12 billion of net intermediate assets.
9. In cases where the capital loss is zero for individual thrifts, e.g., in early periods
of the simulation for well-capitalized thrifts, a negative capital loss is set equal to zero,
i.e., positive earnings for such thrifts are presumed to be paid out as dividends.
10. In the loss calculations for FRMs, equation (1) was modified to incorporate
variable FRM repayment rates.
11. This sounds like a recommendation that thrifts "grow out of the problem," a
policy advocated by many in the early 1980s. Such a policy works if (1) the growth is
investment in safe long-term assets (long-term Treasuries would be better than FRMs)
and (2) interest rates do indeed come back down.
12. For discussion of the perverse incentives facing many thrift managers in the
1980s, see Kane (1989a, chap. 2), Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1990), and Ben-
ston, Carhill, and Olasov, in this volume.
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